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Abstract—Digital Marketplace is a market-based framework
for trading mobile communications services at a service level.
It is well suited for managing a future mobile communications
environment where the one-to-one mapping between network
operators and subscribers no longer holds, and the subscribers
are given the option to select a network operator and a wireless
access technology that matches their preferences best at a service
level. As with any market-based framework, it is important to
analyse the selling mechanism from the economic perspective. In
this paper, we address the deficiencies of previous research on the
economic equilibrium of the Digital Marketplace. We achieve this
by proposing an approximation to the equilibrium of the Digital
Marketplace through the use of an auction with common prior.
Keywords-Digital Marketplace; network selection; auction theory
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile communications has become an indispensable part
of our everyday lives. According to Ofcom [1], 51% of all
adults in the UK own a smartphone, and approximately 24% of
all UK households own a tablet. Furthermore, one in five adults
declares they would miss their mobile most if it were taken
away. It should be noted that these numbers continue to rise,
and with each year the penetration of mobile communications
will increase.
Parallel to this, mobile users are given access to a plethora
of wireless access technologies: from WiFi, through 3G, to the
latest 4G. Cities throughout the UK are now offering free WiFi
hotspots [2]. Furthermore, according to Ofcom [3], while 3G
already covers 98% of the UK population indoors, this figure
is promised to be at least matched by the 4G mobile services
by the end of 2017 at the latest.
To make full use of this increasingly diverse environment
and increase the competition between network operators even
further, the one-to-one mapping between network operators
and subscribers need no longer hold. This allows the sub-
scribers to seamlessly switch not only between different wire-
less access technologies belonging to one particular network
operator, but also between network operators themselves. In
this way, the subscriber, when requesting a bearer service,
is given the option to select a network operator and a
wireless access technology that best matches the required
quality requirements of the service: an Always Best Connected
paradigm [4]. It is not only to the benefit of the subscribers,
however, since the integration of wireless access technologies
will allow network operators for more efficient usage of
network resources.
In order to manage such a complex system, a sophisticated
management platform is required. In this research, we advo-
cate the use of the Digital Marketplace (DMP). DMP is a
market-based framework where network operators compete in
a procurement auction for the right to transport the subscriber’s
requested service over their infrastructure [5], [6]. As with
any market-based framework, it is important to analyse the
selling mechanism from the economic perspective. In [6]–[8],
Konka et al. present the results of such an analysis. They
characterise the equilibrium, and propose numerical methods
for the numerical approximation of the equilibrium, which
is otherwise analytically intractable. The proposed numerical
methods are, however, deficient in the sense that they apply
only to a subset of all bidding scenarios possible within the
DMP. In this paper, we address this problem by modelling the
selling mechanism in the DMP as an auction with common
prior. In an auction with common prior, the range the costs
can vary is the same for each bidder, and for this type of
auctions, there exists a plethora of well-studied numerical
algorithms that can be used to approximate the equilibrium
of the auction. Consequently, we propose an approximation to
the equilibrium of the DMP through the use of an auction with
common prior [9]. Our solution yields results of acceptable
quality, with the approximation error never exceeding 16%,
and importantly, decreasing with the increasing number of
network operators.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
a brief overview of the selling mechanism in the DMP is given.
Section III explains the concept of auction with common prior,
while Section IV describes how the DMP selling mechanism
can be approximated as an auction with common prior. In
Section V, a methodology for quantifying how well the
common prior auction models the DMP auction is given, while
Section VI provides numerical results of approximations in
several scenarios. Finally, Section VII draws conclusions.
II. BIDDING PROBLEM IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE
In order to put the research work presented in this paper
into context, the bidding problem in the DMP is briefly
summarised here. The DMP features an auction-based network
selection mechanism, which is based on a procurement first-
price sealed-bid auction. Following the notation of Konka et
al. [6], there are n = |N | network operators (NOs) who bid
for the right to sell their product to the subscriber. Each NO
is characterised by utility function
ui(bˆ, cˆ) =


1
w
(
bˆi − cˆi
)
if bˆi < min
j 6=i
bˆj ,
0 if bˆi > min
j 6=i
bˆj .
(1)
where bˆ = (bˆi, bˆ−i) is an n-tuple of all NOs bids, cˆ = (cˆi, cˆ−i)
is an n-tuple of all NOs costs, and w ∈ [0, 1] denotes the
weight that the subscriber attaches to the price of the service,
which is inversely proportional to the weight attached to the
reputation of the particular NO by the subscriber. Furthermore,
the costs for each NO are distributed over the interval
cˆi ∈ [cˆi, ¯ˆci] ≡ [(1− w)ri, (1− w)ri + w],
where ri ∈ [0, 1] denotes the reputation for each NO.
As shown in [6], there exists a unique equlibrium to this
bidding problem, and it is characterised by the following
system of ordinary differential equations (ODEs)
d
db
cˆi(b) =
1− Fi(cˆi(b))
fi(cˆi(b))
[
1
n− 1
n∑
k=1
1
b− cˆk(b) −
1
b− cˆi(b)
]
(2)
for i = 1, 2, . . . , n, with the upper boundary condition
cˆi(
¯ˆ
b) =
¯ˆ
b, (3)
and the lower boundary condition
cˆi(bˆ) = min{cˆi, cˆ(bˆ)} (4)
for all i ∈ N . Here, cˆi denotes the inverse bidding functions
for all NOs i ∈ N , while Fi denotes the distribution function
of cˆi. It is possible to derive the analytical solution to the
system in Eq. (2) in the case of n = 2 bidders and Fi
corresponding to uniform distribution. However, for more than
2 bidders, a closed-form solution does not exist.
Two numerical algorithms for approximating the solution to
the system in Eq. (2) are proposed in [6]: forward shooting
method (FSM), and polynomial projection method (PPM).
Both methods were first proposed by Bajari [10] for approxi-
mating auctions with common prior, and were adapted to the
DMP bidding problem in [6]. To give a brief overview of
each method, the FSM is an adaptation of a finite differences
method for approximating solutions to ODEs, while PPM tries
to find the best fitting polynomials to the equilibrium bidding
functions. Due to the nature of the problem, however, the
algorithms handle only a subset of all cases such that the
lower boundary condition (4) is reduced to cˆi(bˆ) = cˆi. It is
the purpose of this paper to address this deficiency by casting
the bidding problem into a simpler setting of common prior
(CP) for which there exists a plethora of numerical solutions
that are well-researched and well-defined [9].
III. AUCTION WITH COMMON PRIOR
In an auction with CP, we assume that each NO i draws
their cost from common support across all bidders; that is,
each NO draws their cost from the interval
cˆi ∈ [cˆ, ¯ˆc] for all i ∈ N.
In this case, the equilibrium is still characterised by the system
of ODEs in Eq. (2), however, with different boundary condi-
tions; that is, with the following upper boundary condition
cˆi(
¯ˆ
b) = ¯ˆc, (5)
and the lower boundary condition
cˆi(bˆ) = cˆ (6)
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
As shown by Lebrun [11], assuming the assumptions gov-
erning the original DMP bidding problem described in [6]
hold, there exists a unique solution to the system of ODEs (2).
Furthermore, similarly to the original bidding problem, the
closed-form solution exists only in a limited number of spe-
cial cases [9], [12]. However, as presented by Hubbard and
Paarsch [9], there exist well-defined numerical methods which
can be used to solve it.
In particular, in this paper, the CP auction is approximated
using the FSM method. It was chosen due to its relatively low
implementation complexity (compared to the PPM method),
and the fact that its variant is also used to approximate the
DMP bidding problem. Therefore, in terms of the numerical
accuracy and stability, the numerical solutions to the DMP and
CP auctions should be of comparable quality.
IV. DIGITAL MARKETPLACE CAST INTO COMMON PRIOR
SETTING
In a CP auction, every NO is characterised by a distribution
(of costs) with common support across all NOs. Hence, in
order to model the DMP auction as an auction with CP, firstly,
we need to agree on a support that is common to every NO and,
at the same time, encompasses the supports of every individual
NO from the original DMP auction. The smallest such support
is
[cˆ, ¯ˆc] =
[
min
i∈N
{cˆi},max
i∈N
{¯ˆci}
]
⊂ [0, 1]. (7)
To see this, recall that, for any given w ∈ (0, 1), assuming
r1 ≤ · · · ≤ rn with at least one inequality strict, it follows
cˆ
1
≤ · · · ≤ cˆn and ¯ˆc1 ≤ · · · ≤ ¯ˆcn with at least one inequality
strict. If we further let Ci = [cˆi,
¯ˆci] then C =
⋃
i∈N Ci is the
smallest set containing all sets Ci for all i ∈ N . Since Ci is
closed for all i ∈ N , it follows that C is closed, and C = [cˆ, ¯ˆc]
such that cˆ ≤ cˆi and ¯ˆci ≤ ¯ˆc for all i ∈ N , which is equivalent
to [mini∈N{cˆi},maxi∈N{¯ˆci}].
All that remains is to then select a family of distributions
which captures the numerical ranges of the original supports
as closely as possible. To provide an illustrative example, let
there be 2 NOs such that cˆ
1
< cˆ
2
< ¯ˆc1 < ¯ˆc2. Each NO
is characterised by a uniform distribution. One possible way
TABLE I
BIDDING SCENARIO WITH 2 NETWORK OPERATORS
Price weight, w Reputation rating, ri
Network operator 1
0.5
0.25
Network operator 2 0.75
of casting this scenario into common prior setting is to model
the distributions of both NOs as truncated normal distributions
truncated to the interval [cˆ
1
, ¯ˆc2], and with differing mean and
standard deviation parameters.
In order to describe the truncated normal distribution, firstly
recall the probability density function (pdf) of standard normal
distribution
φ(cˆ) =
1√
2π
exp
{
−1
2
cˆ2
}
, (8)
and cumulative distribution function (cdf)
Φ(cˆ) =
∫ cˆ
−∞
φ(cˆ)dcˆ =
1
2
[
1 + erf
(
cˆ√
2
)]
(9)
for all cˆ ∈ R. The pdf of the truncated normal distribution,
truncated to the interval cˆ ∈ [cˆ, ¯ˆc], can then be described in
terms of the pdf of the standard normal distribution as follows
f(cˆ;µ, σ, cˆ, ¯ˆc) =
1
σ
φ
(
cˆ−µ
σ
)
Φ
(
¯ˆc−µ
σ
)
− Φ
(
cˆ−µ
σ
) (10)
where µ ∈ R is the mean (or location) of the distribution,
and σ2 ≥ 0 is the variance (or squared scale) [13]. Similarly,
the cdf of the truncated normal distribution can be defined as
follows
F (cˆ;µ, σ, cˆ, ¯ˆc) =
Φ
(
cˆ−µ
σ
)
− Φ
(
cˆ−µ
σ
)
Φ
(
¯ˆc−µ
σ
)
− Φ
(
cˆ−µ
σ
) . (11)
By way of example, consider bidding scenario summarized
in Table I. Suppose we were to cast this scenario into common
prior setting where NOs are characterised by truncated normal
distributions. Firstly, we note that the supports for both NOs
are
[cˆ
1
, ¯ˆc1] = [0.125, 0.625]
for NO 1, and
[cˆ
2
, ¯ˆc2] = [0.375, 0.875]
for NO 2, while the common support is given by
[cˆ, ¯ˆc] = [cˆ
1
, ¯ˆc2] = [0.125, 0.875].
Secondly, we need to specify distribution specific parame-
ters (mean and standard deviation) for each NO. Since the aim
is to approximate the original distributions of both NOs, we
pick the midpoints of the original supports as means, that is,
µi = cˆi +
¯ˆci − cˆi
2
= cˆi +
w
2
,
µ1
σ1
Cost
Density
function
cˆ
1
¯ˆc1 ¯ˆc2
Fig. 1. Choosing parameters for the truncated normal distributions of NOs
TABLE II
NUMERICAL VALUES OF THE CHOSEN TRUNCATED NORMAL
DISTRIBUTION PARAMETERS
Mean, µi Standard deviation, σi
Bidder 1 0.375 0.125
Bidder 2 0.625 0.125
and let the standard deviations be equal to the quarter of the
length of the original supports, that is,
σi =
¯ˆci − cˆi
4
=
w
4
.
The choice of the parameters is motivated by the shape of
the normal distribution, and the fact that, with this choice of
parameters, the probability of at least 0.95 of drawing cost
from the interval [cˆi,
¯ˆci] (which corresponds to the interval
[µi−2σi, µi+2σi]) is achieved [13]; therefore, minimising the
probability of drawing cost from outside the interval [cˆi,
¯ˆci],
and effectively imitating uniform distribution with support
[cˆi,
¯ˆci]. This is depicted in Fig. 1 as the shaded region under
the bell curve, while Table II summarizes the numerical values
of the described parameters.
V. METHODOLOGY FOR QUANTIFYING ACCURACY OF THE
APPROXIMATIONS
In order to quantify how well the CP auction models
the original DMP auction, we shall consider two metrics:
subscriber’s expected price, and ex ante expected utility for
each NO. In this way, we obtain an indicator of how better
off (or worse off) is the subscriber and each of the NOs.
The subscriber’s expected price is equivalent to the expected
value of the winning bid; that is,
p = E[bˆi(cˆi) | bˆi(cˆi) < min
j 6=i
bˆj(cˆj)], (12)
where bˆi is the equilibrium bidding function for all i ∈ N .
Since an analytical derivation of the closed-form solution is
not straightforward, we resort to numerical estimation of the
buyer’s expected price. That is, for each considered bidding
scenario, the costs for each NO are pseudo-randomly drawn
from uniform distribution, the corresponding equilibrium bids
are computed, and the minimum is chosen as the winning bid
(price). This procedure is repeated 1000 times, yielding 1000
i.i.d. observations of the price which are then averaged to give
an estimate of the expected price (consequence of the Strong
Law of Large Numbers [14]).
In order to define the NO’s ex ante expected utility, we
define the expected utility function for each NO i ∈ N as
Πi(cˆi) = (bˆi(cˆi)− cˆi) ·
∏
j 6=i
(
1− Fj(bˆ−1j (bˆi(cˆi)))
)
(13)
where bˆi is the equilibrium bidding function, and Fi is the
distribution function of costs for NO i. The ex ante expected
utility is then equivalent to the expected value of the expected
utility; that is,
Πi = E[Πi(cˆi)] =
∫ ¯ˆci
cˆ
i
Πi(t)dFi(t) (14)
for all i ∈ N . In other words, the ex ante expected utility
can be thought of as the average expected utility for each NO
for each considered bidding scenario, and it follows from the
definition of ex ante expected payments in a standard first-
price auction put forward by Krishna [12].
The way the aforementioned metrics are actually computed
deserves a more elaborate explanation. The numerical deriva-
tion of equilibrium in the CP auction relies on approximating
the NOs’ distributions of costs with truncated normal distri-
butions with common support. When computing the expected
price and ex ante expected utilities for all NOs in the CP
auction, it is assumed, however, that the NOs draw their
costs from their actual (uniform) distributions but use the
equilibrium bidding strategies derived for the CP auction with
truncated normal distributions to compute their bids. In this
way, when computing the expected price and ex ante expected
utilities, we do not misrepresent the NOs’ distributions of
costs, and hence, ensure the comparison results of casting
the DMP auction into CP auction setting are as realistic as
possible.
We further define the relative error in expected prices as
ηp =
∣∣∣∣pDMP − pCPpDMP
∣∣∣∣ (15)
and the relative error in ex ante expected utilities as
ηΠi =
∣∣∣∣ΠDMPi −ΠCPiΠDMPi
∣∣∣∣ (16)
for all i ∈ N , where pDMP and pCP denote the expected
prices for DMP and CP auction respectively, and ΠDMPi and
ΠCPi denote the ex ante expected utilities for NO i for DMP
and CP auction respectively.
VI. APPROXIMATION RESULTS
We analyse the results for three bidding scenarios: with
n = 2, n = 3 and n = 4 NOs respectively. We concentrate
on only upto 4 NOs since with each additional NO, the
time required to simulate the problem increases exponentially.
Furthermore, since the UK market is currently dominated by
an oligopoly of four NOs who own their infrastucture (EE,
Vodafone, O2 and Three), solving the bidding problem for
4 NOs is directly relevant. The procedure for generating the
approximation results is as follows:
1) For each chosen value of price weight, generate 100
reputation ratings n-tuples, (r1, . . . , rn). Each n-tuple
is ordered; that is, r1 < r2 < · · · < rn. Therefore,
in what follows, NO 1 is characterised by the lowest
reputation rating, NO 2 by the second lowest, and so
on. By ordering individual reputation ratings within
the n-tuples, we focus on exploring the mean relative
errors in ex ante expected utilities for individual NOs
characterised by the lowest reputation rating, second
lowest, etc. In other words, if a NO is characterised
by the lowest reputation rating, we quantify the mean
relative error in ex ante expected utility the NO is
going to incur by bidding according to the equilibrium
bidding strategies prescribed by the CP auction. Without
this assumption, the mean relative error curves would
converge on the same value for all NOs, and thus, some
valuable insight into the extent of the mean relative
errors in ex ante expected utilities would be lost. It is
worth noting, however, that the mean relative error in
expected price is unaffected by ordering of the reputation
ratings.
Furthermore, each ri for each NO i is drawn from
a uniform distribution over the range (0, 1). In order
to keep the analysis numerically tractable, we do not
consider bidding scenarios with NOs characterised by
equal reputation ratings.
2) For each reputation ratings n-tuple, evaluate relative
errors in expected price and ex ante expected utility per
NO using Eqs. (15) and (16).
3) Evaluate mean relative errors in expected price and
ex ante expected utility per NO, and associated 95%
confidence intervals.
4) Repeat for price weight values ranging from 0.75 to
0.99. Price weight values are bounded from below by
0.75 which is in line with the work presented in [6],
and it guarantees that the lower boundary condition in
Eq. (4) reduces to cˆi(bˆ) = cˆi. Otherwise, as reported
in [6], it would be impossible to numerically approxi-
mate solutions to the DMP auction using the FSM and
PPM methods as they are not defined for the problem
with unreduced lower boundary condition in Eq. (4).
A. n = 2 Network Operators
The approximation results for two NOs are depicted in
Fig. 2. It is worth observing that as the price weight increases,
the confidence intervals for the mean relative errors decrease.
This is a direct consequence of the fact that as the price
weight w → 1, the actual values of the reputation ratings
of the NOs do not significantly influence the mean relative
0.75 0.80 0.85 0.90 0.95 1.00
Price weight, w
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
P
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
re
la
ti
ve
er
ro
r
Price
Bidder 1
Bidder 2
Fig. 2. Approximation results for 2 NOs
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Fig. 3. Approximation results for 3 NOs
errors in expected price and ex ante expected utilities for both
NOs. To see this, recall from Eq. (7) the common support
[mini ci,maxi c¯i] = [(1−w)mini ri, (1−w)maxi ri+w]. As
w → 1, this reduces to [limw→1(1− w)mini ri, limw→1(1−
w)maxi ri+w] = [0, 1]. Hence, as the price weight increases,
the less significant the effect of the reputation ratings on the
common support.
Furthermore, as the price weight approaches 1, the mean
relative errors in ex ante expected utilities for both NOs
start to converge. This is due to the fact that, as w → 1
and in particular at w = 1, the DMP auction becomes a
standard first-price auction with all NOs characterised by
uniform distributions which are overlapping to a high degree;
i.e., with some abuse of notation, Fi(x) ≈ Fj(x) for all x,
i 6= j and i, j ∈ N . The same is true for the CP auction with
this difference that all NOs are characterised by almost equal
truncated normal distributions. Furthermore, in both auctions,
the NOs are characterised by symmetric, albeit different across
auctions, equilibrium bidding strategies. This is due to the fact
that at a symmetric equilibrium the support becomes identical
in both auctions, and hence, uniform distribution of costs and
truncated normal distribution of costs have to result in different
equilibrium bidding strategies. This in turn leads to almost
equal mean relative errors in ex ante expected utilities for all
NOs.
The mean error in expected prices is approximately linearly
increasing in price weight, and is bounded from above by 8%
and from below by 4%. The mean error in ex ante expected
utility for NO 1 also linearly increasing in price weight, and is
bounded from above by 15% and from below by 10%. For NO
2, however, the relationship between the price weight and the
mean error is nonlinear, with the error attaining its maximum
of approximately 15.5% for the price weight of w ≈ 0.8. It
is bounded from above by 15.5% and from below by 14%. It
is clear that NO 1 who is characterised by lower reputation
rating is experiencing overall smaller mean error for all values
of the price weight. However, as w → 1 and as explained in
the previous paragraph, the mean error converges on the same
value of approximately 15% for both NOs.
B. n = 3 Network Operators
Figure 3 depicts the approximation results for three NOs.
First of all, it should be noted that the first two observations
pointed out in case of two NOs also apply to the current
case of three NOs. All mean relative errors, unlike in the
case of two NOs, however, exhibit clear nonlinearity in price
weight. Furthermore, the mean relative error in expected prices
is increasing as the price weight increases, and achieves its
maximum at w = 0.99. It is bounded from above by 5% and
from below by 2%. The mean relative error in ex ante expected
utilities for NO 1 is bounded from above by 10% and from
below by 5%. The mean relative error in ex ante expected
utilities for NO 2 is also bounded from above by 10%, but
it is bounded from below by 8%. It is worth noting that the
shape of the mean relative error curve for NO 2 resembles
that of the mean relative error curve for NO 1 translated in y-
direction. Finally, the mean relative error in ex ante expected
utilities for NO 3 is bounded from above by approximately
12% and from below by 10%.
As expected, NO 3 who is characterised by the highest
reputation rating experiences the highest mean relative error
in ex ante expected utilities for all values of the price weight
out of all NOs. In fact, the lower bound for NO 3 is the same
as the upper bound for the remaining NOs. This agrees with
the conclusion drawn for the case of two NOs, where NO 2
was the NO characterised by the highest reputation rating and
experienced the highest mean relative error out of all NOs.
C. n = 4 Network Operators
Figure 4 depicts the approximation results for four NOs.
Firstly, it should be noted that, similarly to the previous
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Fig. 4. Approximation results for 4 NOs
two scenarios, as the price weight approaches 1, the mean
relative errors in ex ante expected utilities for all NOs start
to converge. Furthermore, as the price weight increases, the
confidence intervals for the mean relative errors decrease. In
terms of shape of the mean relative error curves, similarly to
the case of three NOs, all mean relative errors exhibit some
nonlinearity in price weight. Furthermore, the mean relative
error in expected prices is bounded from above by 1%, and
from below by approximately 0.1%. The mean relative error
in ex ante expected utilities for NO 1 is bounded from above
by 2%, and from below by approximately 0.1%. The mean
relative error in ex ante expected utilities for NO 2 is bounded
from above by 2%, and from below by 0.1%. It is worth noting
that, for the values of price weight w ∈ [0.75, 0.9], the mean
relative error for NO 2 is actually smaller than for NO 1, even
though NO 1 is characterised by the lowest reputation rating.
The mean relative error in ex ante expected utilities for NO
3 is bounded from above by 3%, and from below by 1.5%.
Finally, the mean relative error for NO 4 is bounded from
above by 8%, and from below by 1.5%.
As expected, NO 4 who is characterised by the highest
reputation rating experiences the highest mean relative error
in ex ante expected utilities for all values of the price weight
out of all NOs. This agrees with the conclusion drawn for
the previous two bidding scenarios, where NO who was
characterised by the highest reputation rating, experienced the
highest mean relative error out of all NOs.
D. Discussion
Considering all bidding scenarios together, it should be
noted that, for all considered price weight values, the mean
relative error in expected prices is decreasing as the number
of NOs increases. Similarly, the mean relative error in ex ante
expected utilities for all NOs decreases as the number of NOs
increases. As a consequence, as the number of NOs increases,
the mean relative error for the price weight approaching 1
decreases as well. However, for NO characterised by the
highest reputation rating, we observe that, as the number of
NOs increases, the range of mean relative errors grows larger.
All in all, it can be concluded that the CP auction becomes
a more accurate approximation to the DMP auction with the
increasing number of NOs.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have shown how a selling mechanim
employed by the Digital Marketplace can be modelled as an
auction with common prior. For this type of auctions, there
exists a plethora of well-studied numerical algorithms that can
be used to approximate the equilibrium of the auction.
The paper has explored 3 bidding scenarios: with n = 2,
n = 3 and n = 4 network operators. It was shown that
the network operator characterised by the highest reputation
rating will incur the highest approximation error in all cases.
Furthermore, it was also shown that, as the number of network
operators increases, the approximation error decreases.
All in all, it can be concluded that approximating the
selling mechanism employed by the Digital Marketplace with
a common prior auction constitutes a valid alternative, and as
such, even though not perfectly accurate, it might be a more
desirable option for the network operators due to the wealth of
numerical methods available that have been extensively studied
by the researchers.
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